Aircraft hijacking (also known as skyjacking and sky jacking) is the unlawful seizure of an aircraft either by an individual or by a group. In most cases, the pilot is forced to fly according to the orders of the hijackers. However, there have been cases where the hijackers have flown the aircraft themselves. In at least one case, a plane was hijacked by the official pilot.
Unlike the hijacking of land vehicles or ships, skyjacking is usually not perpetrated in order to rob the cargo. Most aircraft hijackings are committed to use the passengers as hostages. Motives vary from demanding the release of certain inmates (notably IC-814) to highlighting the grievances of a particular community (notably AF 8969). Hijacking may also be carried out so as to use the aircraft as a weapon to target a particular location (notably September 11, 2001 attacks). Other hijackers may hold the hostages for ransom.
Most hijackings for hostages result in a series negotiation between the hijackers and the authorities, followed by some form of settlement. However, these settlements do not always meet the hijackers' original demands. If the hijackers show no sign of surrendering, armed special forces may be used by authorities to rescue the hostages (notably Operation Entebbe).
History
The first recorded aircraft hijack took place on February 21, 1931 in Arequipa, Peru. Byron Rickards, flying a Ford Tri-Motor, was approached on the ground by armed revolutionaries. He refused to fly them anywhere and after a ten day stand-off Rickards was informed that the revolution was successful and he could go in return for giving one group member a lift to Lima. However, most hijackings have not been so farcical.
Between 1948 and 1957, there were 15 hijackings all over the world, an average of a little more than one per annum. Between 1958 and 1967, this climbed to 48—an annual average of about five. There was an explosive increase to 38 in 1968 and 82 in 1969, the largest number in a single year in the history of civil aviation. During the third 10-year period between 1968 and 1977, there were 414 hijackings—an annual average of 41.
The increase since 1958 could be attributed to the following factors:
* The use by the USA's Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) of inspired hijackings as a weapon of destabilisation against the Fidel Castro regime which had seized power in Cuba in January, 1959. The hijackers inspired or instigated by the CIA did not make any political demands as a price for releasing the aircraft and passengers. They just forced the pilot to fly to either the US naval base at Guantanamo in Cuba or to the US and sought political asylum after condemning the communist regime at a press conference arranged by the CIA. The US did not return the planes to Cuba. Instead, these were ordered to be seized by US courts as compensation for the properties of US businessmen nationalised by the Castro regime.
* The retaliatory hijackings inspired or instigated by the Cuban intelligence, involving either US or non-US aircraft carrying a large number of US nationals. Like the CIA, the Cuban intelligence used these hijackings purely as a psychological weapon to have the US discredited.
* The emulation of the CIA's covert action technique by the Taiwanese intelligence in its psychological warfare against People's Republic of China by inspiring or instigating hijackings from the mainland to Taiwan.
* The beginning of the extensive use of hijackings as a weapon of national liberation or ideological struggle by the various Palestinian organisations and ideological groups supporting the Palestinian cause such as the Red Army Faction of West Germany and Japanese Red Army after the Arab-Israeli war of July, 1967. The targets of their hijackings were mainly Israeli nationals.
* The use of hijackings as a weapon of struggle by other political, religious or ideological organisations or political dissident groups in the rest of the world. Some of these were supported by foreign intelligence agencies such as the support of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) of Pakistan to various anti-Indian groups since 1971, while others were not.
The second Nixon Administration, which came to office in 1973, ordered the discontinuance by the CIA of the use of hijacking as a covert action weapon against the Castro regime. The Cuban intelligence followed suit. The same year, the two countries reached an agreement for the prosecution or return of the hijackers and the aircraft to each other's country. The Taiwanese intelligence also followed the CIA's example-vis-а-vis China.
These measures plus the improvement in Israel's relations with Egypt and Jordan, the renunciation of terrorism by the Palestine Liberation Organisation, the on-going peace talks between the PLO and Israel, the collapse of the communist states in East Europe, which reduced the scope for sanctuaries for terrorists, and the more cautious attitude of countries such as Libya and Syria after the US declared them State-sponsors of international terrorism, the collapse of ideological terrorist groups such as the Red Army Faction and the tightening of civil aviation security measures by all countries have arrested and reversed the steep upward movement of hijackings.
However, the situation has not returned to the pre-1968 level and the number of successful hijackings continues to be disturbingly high -an average of 18 per annum during the 10-year period between 1988 and 1997, as against the pre-1968 average of five.
Dealing with hijackings
Before the September 11, 2001 attacks, pilots and flight attendants were trained to adopt the "Common Strategy" tactic, which was approved by the FAA. It taught crew members to comply with the hijackers demands, get the plane to land safely and then let the security forces handle the situation. Crew members advised passengers to sit quietly in order to increase their chances of survival. They were also trained not to make any 'heroic' moves that could endanger themselves or other people. The FAA realized that the longer a hijacking persisted, the more likely it would end peacefully with the hijackers reaching their goal.
September 11 presented a unique situation because it involved suicide hijackers who could fly an aircraft. The "Common Strategy" tactic was not designed to handle suicide hijackings. This resulted in the hijackers exploiting a weakness in the civil aviation security system. Since then the "Common Strategy" policy is no longer used.
Since the September 11th attacks, the situation for passengers and hijackers has changed. As in the case of United Airlines Flight 93, where an airliner crashed into a field during a fight between passengers and hijackers, passengers now have to calculate the risks of passive cooperation, not only for themselves but also for those on the ground. Future hijackers most likely will encounter greater resistance from passengers and flight crews, making a successful hijacking more unlikely. An example of active passenger resistance occurred when passengers of American Airlines Flight 63 from Paris to Miami on December 22, 2001 helped prevent Richard Reid from igniting explosives hidden in his shoe. Flight attendants and pilots now receive extensive anti-hijacking and self-defense training designed to thwart a hijacking.
Informing air traffic control
To communicate to air traffic control that an aircraft is being hijacked, a pilot under duress should squawk 7500 or vocally, by radio communication, transmit "(Aircraft callsign); Transponder seven five zero zero." This should be done when possible and safe. An air traffic controller who suspects an aircraft may have been hijacked may ask the pilot to confirm "squawk (or transponder) seven five zero zero." If the aircraft is not being hijacked, the pilot should not squawk 7500 and should inform the controller accordingly. A pilot under duress may also elect to respond that the aircraft is not being hijacked, but then neglect to change to a different squawk code. In this case the controller would make no further requests and immediately inform the appropriate authorities. A complete lack of a response would also be taken to indicate a possible hijacking. Of course, a loss of radio communications may also be the cause for a lack of response, in which case a pilot would usually squawk 7600 anyway.
Shooting down aircraft
Several states have stated that they would shoot down hijacked commercial aircraft if it can be assumed that the hijackers intend to use the aircraft in a 9/11-style attack, despite killing innocent passengers onboard. According to reports, US fighter pilots have been training to shoot down hijacked commercial airliners should it become necessary. Other countries such as Poland and India have enacted laws or decrees that allow the shooting down of hijacked planes.
Germany
In a widely regarded decision by the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany, in February 2006, it struck down a law - "Luftsicherheitsgesetz" or "Air security law" - claiming such preventive measures were unconstitutional and would essentially be state-sponsored murder, even if such an act would save many more lives on the ground. The main reasoning behind this decision was that the state would effectively be taking the lives of innocent hostages in order to avoid a terrorist attack. The Court also ruled that the Minister of Defense is constitutionally not entitled to act in terrorism matters, as this is the duty of the state and federal police forces. See the German Wikipedia entry, or
The President of Germany, Horst Köhler, himself urged judicial review of the constitutionality of the Luftsicherheitsgesetz after he signed it into law in 2005.
Unlike the hijacking of land vehicles or ships, skyjacking is usually not perpetrated in order to rob the cargo. Most aircraft hijackings are committed to use the passengers as hostages. Motives vary from demanding the release of certain inmates (notably IC-814) to highlighting the grievances of a particular community (notably AF 8969). Hijacking may also be carried out so as to use the aircraft as a weapon to target a particular location (notably September 11, 2001 attacks). Other hijackers may hold the hostages for ransom.
Most hijackings for hostages result in a series negotiation between the hijackers and the authorities, followed by some form of settlement. However, these settlements do not always meet the hijackers' original demands. If the hijackers show no sign of surrendering, armed special forces may be used by authorities to rescue the hostages (notably Operation Entebbe).
History
The first recorded aircraft hijack took place on February 21, 1931 in Arequipa, Peru. Byron Rickards, flying a Ford Tri-Motor, was approached on the ground by armed revolutionaries. He refused to fly them anywhere and after a ten day stand-off Rickards was informed that the revolution was successful and he could go in return for giving one group member a lift to Lima. However, most hijackings have not been so farcical.
Between 1948 and 1957, there were 15 hijackings all over the world, an average of a little more than one per annum. Between 1958 and 1967, this climbed to 48—an annual average of about five. There was an explosive increase to 38 in 1968 and 82 in 1969, the largest number in a single year in the history of civil aviation. During the third 10-year period between 1968 and 1977, there were 414 hijackings—an annual average of 41.
The increase since 1958 could be attributed to the following factors:
* The use by the USA's Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) of inspired hijackings as a weapon of destabilisation against the Fidel Castro regime which had seized power in Cuba in January, 1959. The hijackers inspired or instigated by the CIA did not make any political demands as a price for releasing the aircraft and passengers. They just forced the pilot to fly to either the US naval base at Guantanamo in Cuba or to the US and sought political asylum after condemning the communist regime at a press conference arranged by the CIA. The US did not return the planes to Cuba. Instead, these were ordered to be seized by US courts as compensation for the properties of US businessmen nationalised by the Castro regime.
* The retaliatory hijackings inspired or instigated by the Cuban intelligence, involving either US or non-US aircraft carrying a large number of US nationals. Like the CIA, the Cuban intelligence used these hijackings purely as a psychological weapon to have the US discredited.
* The emulation of the CIA's covert action technique by the Taiwanese intelligence in its psychological warfare against People's Republic of China by inspiring or instigating hijackings from the mainland to Taiwan.
* The beginning of the extensive use of hijackings as a weapon of national liberation or ideological struggle by the various Palestinian organisations and ideological groups supporting the Palestinian cause such as the Red Army Faction of West Germany and Japanese Red Army after the Arab-Israeli war of July, 1967. The targets of their hijackings were mainly Israeli nationals.
* The use of hijackings as a weapon of struggle by other political, religious or ideological organisations or political dissident groups in the rest of the world. Some of these were supported by foreign intelligence agencies such as the support of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) of Pakistan to various anti-Indian groups since 1971, while others were not.
The second Nixon Administration, which came to office in 1973, ordered the discontinuance by the CIA of the use of hijacking as a covert action weapon against the Castro regime. The Cuban intelligence followed suit. The same year, the two countries reached an agreement for the prosecution or return of the hijackers and the aircraft to each other's country. The Taiwanese intelligence also followed the CIA's example-vis-а-vis China.
These measures plus the improvement in Israel's relations with Egypt and Jordan, the renunciation of terrorism by the Palestine Liberation Organisation, the on-going peace talks between the PLO and Israel, the collapse of the communist states in East Europe, which reduced the scope for sanctuaries for terrorists, and the more cautious attitude of countries such as Libya and Syria after the US declared them State-sponsors of international terrorism, the collapse of ideological terrorist groups such as the Red Army Faction and the tightening of civil aviation security measures by all countries have arrested and reversed the steep upward movement of hijackings.
However, the situation has not returned to the pre-1968 level and the number of successful hijackings continues to be disturbingly high -an average of 18 per annum during the 10-year period between 1988 and 1997, as against the pre-1968 average of five.
Dealing with hijackings
Before the September 11, 2001 attacks, pilots and flight attendants were trained to adopt the "Common Strategy" tactic, which was approved by the FAA. It taught crew members to comply with the hijackers demands, get the plane to land safely and then let the security forces handle the situation. Crew members advised passengers to sit quietly in order to increase their chances of survival. They were also trained not to make any 'heroic' moves that could endanger themselves or other people. The FAA realized that the longer a hijacking persisted, the more likely it would end peacefully with the hijackers reaching their goal.
September 11 presented a unique situation because it involved suicide hijackers who could fly an aircraft. The "Common Strategy" tactic was not designed to handle suicide hijackings. This resulted in the hijackers exploiting a weakness in the civil aviation security system. Since then the "Common Strategy" policy is no longer used.
Since the September 11th attacks, the situation for passengers and hijackers has changed. As in the case of United Airlines Flight 93, where an airliner crashed into a field during a fight between passengers and hijackers, passengers now have to calculate the risks of passive cooperation, not only for themselves but also for those on the ground. Future hijackers most likely will encounter greater resistance from passengers and flight crews, making a successful hijacking more unlikely. An example of active passenger resistance occurred when passengers of American Airlines Flight 63 from Paris to Miami on December 22, 2001 helped prevent Richard Reid from igniting explosives hidden in his shoe. Flight attendants and pilots now receive extensive anti-hijacking and self-defense training designed to thwart a hijacking.
Informing air traffic control
To communicate to air traffic control that an aircraft is being hijacked, a pilot under duress should squawk 7500 or vocally, by radio communication, transmit "(Aircraft callsign); Transponder seven five zero zero." This should be done when possible and safe. An air traffic controller who suspects an aircraft may have been hijacked may ask the pilot to confirm "squawk (or transponder) seven five zero zero." If the aircraft is not being hijacked, the pilot should not squawk 7500 and should inform the controller accordingly. A pilot under duress may also elect to respond that the aircraft is not being hijacked, but then neglect to change to a different squawk code. In this case the controller would make no further requests and immediately inform the appropriate authorities. A complete lack of a response would also be taken to indicate a possible hijacking. Of course, a loss of radio communications may also be the cause for a lack of response, in which case a pilot would usually squawk 7600 anyway.
Shooting down aircraft
Several states have stated that they would shoot down hijacked commercial aircraft if it can be assumed that the hijackers intend to use the aircraft in a 9/11-style attack, despite killing innocent passengers onboard. According to reports, US fighter pilots have been training to shoot down hijacked commercial airliners should it become necessary. Other countries such as Poland and India have enacted laws or decrees that allow the shooting down of hijacked planes.
Germany
In a widely regarded decision by the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany, in February 2006, it struck down a law - "Luftsicherheitsgesetz" or "Air security law" - claiming such preventive measures were unconstitutional and would essentially be state-sponsored murder, even if such an act would save many more lives on the ground. The main reasoning behind this decision was that the state would effectively be taking the lives of innocent hostages in order to avoid a terrorist attack. The Court also ruled that the Minister of Defense is constitutionally not entitled to act in terrorism matters, as this is the duty of the state and federal police forces. See the German Wikipedia entry, or
The President of Germany, Horst Köhler, himself urged judicial review of the constitutionality of the Luftsicherheitsgesetz after he signed it into law in 2005.
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